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I. EBB TIDE FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
During the 1991 Centennial on the Bill of Rights, Justice Stevens
visited the University of Chicago Law School to deliver an address on
the historical mission of the Supreme Court as a defender of the Bill
of Rights.' Much of his talk addressed the exploits of the Warren
Court and the major contributions that it made to the law on freedom
of speech and religion, on criminal procedure, and on voting rights.
As befits a Justice whose own judicial and intellectual work made him
sympathetic with the basic orientation of the Warren Court, he spent
none of his time talking about the contributions that the Warren
Court made in the protection of private property or economic liber-
ties. Nor did he speak of the jurisprudence which explained why these
rights might properly be limited under a sound application of the
state's admitted police power.
His omissions were not inadvertent.- The question of property
rights, their status and protection, was not an issue that much troubled
or preoccupied the Warren Court. The Court did not hand down a
single decision during the years 1954 to 1969 which ranks in the top
dozen of important takings cases under the Constitution. The years
before and after the Warren Court, however, saw extensive and diffi-
cult litigation under the Takings Clause (not to mention the kindred
issues that are raised under the Contracts Clause and the Due Process
Clauses). Just to name a few of the great cases, Mugler v. Kansas,2
Block v. Hirsh,3 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,4 Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,5 and Miller v. Schoene6 all were decided before
the constitutional watershed of 1937, and all sharply expanded the
scope of state regulation over private property. Similarly, after the
end of the Warren Court, the pace again picks up. There are such
important cases as Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York,7 Agins v. City of Tiburon,s Hawaii Housing Authority v.
1. Justice John P. Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 13 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992). It seems hardly surpris-
ing that Justice Stevens issued impassioned dissents in both Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2917 (1992) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2322 (1994).
2. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
3. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
4. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
7. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
8. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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Midkiff,9 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,1" Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council," and Dolan v. City of Tigard.'2 The closest
that one can come to decisive takings cases in the Warren Court are
such decisions as Berman v. Parker,13 United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co.,4 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,'5 and Armstrong v.
United States,'6 which were either mopping-up operations, or modest
extensions of the existing law. Occasionally, there are hints of larger
problems that have not been fully resolved, but these are mentioned
without being fully explored or debated. And some of the most dar-
ing innovations in the takings area, such as Reitman v. Mulkey 7 and
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.'8 are thought of more as civil rights cases
than property cases, which accounts for much of their difficulty. But
insofar as the focus of analysis is the protection of property rights and
economic liberties, there is little energy, excitement or sense of intel-
lectual adventure in the Warren Court. If an analysis of any topic of
Warren Court jurisprudence could safely be omitted, I suspect takings
and economic liberties more generally would be it.
It is instructive to seek some explanations for this high level of
Warren Court quiescence on property rights issues when there was
such a high degree of tumult in other areas of its work. The best ex-
planations do not reflect ill upon the Warren Court. It is a common-
place observation, easily forgotten, that courts do not generate the
controversies that come before them. While the power of certiorari
gives the Supreme Court the power to pick its cases and to hone in on
its issues, that power does not allow it to enter into areas where there
are no existing controversies between litigants. The Court should
make sure that important issues stirring below receive its full atten-
tion. But it cannot command legislatures and litigants to redirect their
private agendas to suit its own purposes. And for most of the Warren
Court, property rights issues of all stripes and decisions were not at
the front of the American political consciousness.
9. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
10. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
11. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
12. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
13. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
14. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
15. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
16. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
17. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
18. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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There are two explanations for this general trend. The first is his-
torical. The constitutional watershed of the 1937 Term' 9 had the effect
of blocking property-rights based challenges to the exercise of govern-
mental power on matters of general economic regulation. Questions
of economic liberty were also given short shrift, as legislation on these
matters was subject to a very low standard of review largely under the
Due Process Clause, where even minimum rationality would suffice.2"
After 1937, Lochner v. New York" came to symbolize a bygone era in
which the Supreme Court abused its constitutional power to protect
private property and freedom of contract by falsely elevating common
law categories to constitutional levels.'
Yet it is important not to overstate the importance of the 1937
revolution on the status of property rights, whose constitutional pro-
tection had been in decline for over half a century. Anyone who takes
a cool and dispassionate look at the property rights and economic lib-
erties cases between 1880 and 1936 can only reach one conclusion:
there was throughout that period a steady expansion in the scope of
government power in all areas of economic life: limitations on the
power of taxation were rebuffed;' state regulation of health and
safety were expanded, even in the teeth of private contract;2 4 rent con-
trol received at least a qualified constitutional blessing;25 zoning pow-
ers received very broad construction on their first go-round;26 and the
common law accounts of nuisance were solemnly adjudged not to
place limits on the state's power to protect one neighbor from the
19. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
20. The standard citations are Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
21. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22. For a summary of the attack on Lochner as falsely constitutionalizing common law
norms of property and contract, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 8.6, at 579 (2d ed. 1988).
Just as the Swift v. Tyson doctrine that federal judges should apply the "general
common law" in diversity cases could not survive the belief that there just was no tran-
scendent body of binding general common law, so too that belief ultimately devastated
Lochner's due process doctrine that legislatures may not upset the "natural" conditions
of contract and property enshrined in common law categories and in their logical
entailments.
Id. My own views in RICHARD A. EPsTEiN, TAKINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) are designed to reestablish the broken link between the common law
and the constitutional protection of property rights. The book meets with, to say the least, a cool
reception from Tribe. See TRIBE, supra at 606.
23. See, e.g., New York Trust v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
24. New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
25. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
26. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
[Vol. 31:643
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harmful activities of another.27 Only in the area of labor contracts did
the pre-1937 era show some genuine constitutional backbone.
Mandatory collective bargaining arrangements were wisely struck
down at both the federal28 and the state29 level. And a minimum
wage statute applicable to women only (and thus suspect on two
grounds - an infringement of liberty and an explicit sex classifica-
tion) was similarly derailed.3" But set against the trends in property
law, the view that 1937 represents a sharp break with some laissez
faire past is both an oversimplification of its constitutional sweep and
an incorrect denial of the steady enlargement of state power.3' Loch-
ner was a case, not an era.
Substantial limitations commanded broad assent before the 1937
watershed and continued to command it thereafter. At the onset of
the Warren Court the question was not how the Court should recon-
sider those limitations on property rights that had uniformly expanded
over the past sixty or more years. Rather, the issue was how it could
disentangle the question of property fights from the other side of the
coin and offer heightened levels of constitutional scrutiny in other ar-
eas in order to make good on the "two tiers of justice" that were ar-
ticulated with such clarity and influence in the famous footnote 4 of
the Carolene Products case. 2 The first explanation for the passivity of
the Warren Court on matters of property fights is that there was no
intellectual debate to fuel judicial controversy over the proper size
and scope of property rights.
The second explanation is less theoretical and more practical - it
involves not history, but politics. The contemporary legislative
agenda did not force the Court to mediate between aggressive state
regulators and beleaguered property owners. It is remarkable to re-
count the large number of property fights cases in the Warren Court
that were concerned with dams and water fights, the precise definition
of a flowage easement, or the scope of the navigation servitude
(largely settled some fifty years before). But these cases doubtless
came out of the expansive program for dam construction in an age
that was not keen on keeping wilderness pristine. Even five years
27. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
28. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
29. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
30. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
31. And on this point at least, Laurence Tribe and I agree. See TRiNE, supra note 22, at
§ 8.5.
32. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
1996]
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before, the Court had seen a constant stream of disputes over lease-
hold property that originated in temporary takings during World War
11.33 Occasionally these cases surfaced in the Warren Court, but in
obviously diminishing numbers. Otherwise a fair number of cases
dealt with such topics as the priority of government liens, the rules
governing the extinction of the equitable rights of redemption in fore-
closure (itself a holdover from the questions of the 1930s), 3 and occa-
sionally novel applications of the zoning law. But in truth the early
Euclid decision 35 was so strongly pro-state that these cases only tested
the limits of the basic question, but did nothing to reorder fundamen-
tal priorities.
It was only with the rise of far more aggressive legislation in the
1970s and afterwards that novel property claims flooded the courts,
for by that time there was some effort to attack the existing synthesis
(of which my Takings36 book is probably the most prominent, and to
many the most misguided). Landmark preservation statutes, wetlands
and endangered species, and coastal controls and protection did (and
do) represent a new effort of government to go beyond the old pow-
ers, efforts that met with powerful resistance. The holdovers from the
Warren Court (e.g. Justices Brennan and White) showed themselves
to be generally unsympathetic with these property rights claims, 37 and
it seems to be a fair assumption that they would have proved every bit
as hostile to similar claims if these had been pressed during the 1950s
and 1960s. But far be it from me to condemn the Warren Court for
deeds that took place after it passed into the mists of history.
With this said there is one irony that does deserve a brief men-
tion. The academic scholarship on the Takings Clause has turned out,
at least in part, to be more influential than the decisions of the Court
itself. Here, in particular, the work of Joseph Sax,38 and Frank
Michelman 39 were both marked advances over all in the academic
33. See, eg., United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
34. See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
35. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
36. RicHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DoMAIN (1985).
37. See, e.g., Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978) and his dissent in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See
also his opinion in Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
38. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
39. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
dons of "Just Compensation Law," 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
[Vol. 31:643
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literature that preceded them. Both writers conveyed a clear aware-
ness of the immense difficulty associated with any purported compre-
hensive solution to the takings problem. This seemingly simple
problem requires judgments not only about the status of private prop-
erty, but also the nature of the government institutions that regulate,
tax, or take private property. Behavioral assumptions about the good-
ness and badness of government are not simply curiosities that lead
nowhere in the debate over constitutional interpretation. Rather,
they are an integral part of any analysis, for in dealing with any form
of government activity it becomes critical to know the motivations and
objectives of the state agencies that initiate the changes, and, of neces-
sity, of the individuals who compose them.n°
This academic work highlights how difficult it is (pace the current
law) to distinguish in principled fashion between regulatory and physi-
cal takings. Even with the latter the takings in question must be paid
for by someone, and they impose costs above and beyond the raw
value of land. Tracking down the distributional consequences of these
takings can be quite complex, and the patterns of abuse that can exist
with them may be quite large, especially when the "just compensa-
tion" measures applied by the courts are systematically below the
level necessary to leave individual landowners indifferent between the
continued possession of their lands and the compensation that the
state offers as a substitute for it. Berman v. Parker41 was a Warren
Court decision that implicated a comprehensive use of the takings
power, which anticipated the incidents that took place in Poletownn2 in
the 1970s and in Hawaii in the 1980s and 1990s.n3 Efforts to deal with
the distinction between arbitral and entrepreneurial government ac-
tivities, or to find the role of demoralization costs and the like, stem
from an awareness that it is not possible to cabin in the eminent do-
main question by artificial limitation and narrow categorization. The
effort to figure out who can take and what can be taken becomes by
degrees a blueprint for how good constitutional norms can guard
against government disasters.
Oddly enough there is scant trace of any of this intellectual fer-
ment in the Warren court decisions. The academic writings did not
40. I push this point hard in Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech and the Politics of Dis-
trust, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 41, 47-55 (1992).
41. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
42. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
43. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
1996]
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have time to penetrate into the judicial chambers, so that the two fac-
tors identified above - history and politics - continued to hold sway.
The absence of any intellectual tension meant that judges had no in-
centive to probe into these questions. The absence of bold new gov-
ernment programs kept the judicial doctrine barren of the tough
substantive disputes that could have energized a lagging area. The
harvest here therefore is far more meager than it is in other areas.
Nonetheless, a study of the Warren Court's takings decisions helps set
the stage for contemporary understandings of the takings issue.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE WARREN COURT DECISIONS
A regrettable but necessary truth about judicial decisions is that
they do not come up in the order in which professors would like to
discuss them. Indeed one of the major function of theorists and edi-
tors alike is to come up with some structure that permits unruly cases
to be tied into neat bundles. For these purposes, this paper will adopt
the structure of argument that flows fairly from the language of the
Takings Clause itself, and which in any event is adopted in a mostly
post-Warren Court treatment of the subject - my Takings book.
Thereafter the loose ends will be picked up with cases outside the tak-
ings area that raise similar issues, albeit it in very different ways, under
both the Contracts and the Equal Protection Clauses.
In Takings, two ways of stating the takings problem are distin-
guished. The first and most common approach asks whether govern-
ment action amounts to a compensable taking, on the implicit
assumption that there is no other kind. The great disadvantage of this
view is that it collapses conceptually distinct issues, and unfortunately
confuses the analysis. The analogy, here, is to private tort law. Tort
theory does not approach the compensability of injury as a unitary
question. Rather, it divides the analysis into at least four elements:
(1) the prima facie case (causation and the basis of liability), (2) af-
firmative defenses, covering the justifications or excuses based on
plaintiff's conduct, (3) the choice of remedy (damages, injunctions, or
some mix of the two) and (4) what level of compensation or damages
should be provided for the harms so committed. Takings questions
are better analyzed by this more nuanced analysis than by merely ask-
ing the single question, is the taking compensable?
These tort issues have their concrete parallels in the law of emi-
nent domain. The first task is to set up the prima facie case, and to
[Vol. 31:643
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ask whether property was taken by the government. The second ques-
tion is to ask whether the taking was justified in virtue of some wrong
that the plaintiff committed, or threatened to commit: in constitu-
tional discourse, these are typically questions about the scope of the
state's police power to regulate without compensation." When such
justifications fail, the third question is whether the taking was allowed
at all. Stated otherwise, the public use requirement in effect limits the
power of coercion to certain types of cases and allows the citizen to
block the state in at least some cases. A distinctive question, not com-
monly found in tort analysis, fourth, is the question of whether just
compensation has been provided when the taking is done, is for public
use, but is not justified under the "police power." These issues are
the leitmotifs of any system of takings law, and while the cases them-
selves do not precisely track the four parts of this analysis, they are
best understood if these issues are broken out. Some cases raise two
or more of the issues together, and in those cases it is all the more
imperative to keep the lines of analysis as clear as possible. Let us
consider the four categories together.
A. The Prima Facie Case: A Taking of Private Property
1. Water
The question of what counts as a taking of private property ini-
tially depends on the question of what counts as property in the first
place. In dealing with land, the question is normally one of metes and
bounds, and thus not subject to many definitional inquiries. The fixed
nature of the resource creates enormous economic efficiencies from
separating land into different plots and policing the boundaries be-
tween neighbors by the law of trespass and nuisance. But with water
law the position has always (from at least Roman times) been other-
wise. The movement of the water means that any attempt to reduce it
all to possession destroys the value of the resource so that the idiom of
water rights has always been one of limited use, correlative rights and
duties, sharing, usufruct and servitudes. It is therefore jarring, to say
44. It is important to recall that in some cases the question is whether it is within the scope
of the state's police power to regulate when compensation is required, which raises obviously
different questions. Yet even these points are sometimes confused. Compare West River Bridge
Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848), which upheld the power to condemn a bridge that the
government had conveyed to a private owner upon just compensation, with Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), where the same police power justification arguably was
used to allow a state mortgage moratorium without compensation. For a comparison of the two
decisions, see Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CMs. L.
REv. 703, 735-738, 740-743 (1984). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying note 75.
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the least, that the traditional Supreme Court view of property rights in
water says that the Federal Government, in virtue of its power to reg-
ulate under the Commerce Clause, has a "superior navigation ease-
ment that sweeps all aside."'4
That development, however, long predated the Warren Court,
having its origin in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Power Co.,
which attributed to the navigation easement a dominance that it
hardly deserves. In United States v. Twin City Power Co.,46 the Warren
Court pointedly refused to re-examine these issues. Justice Douglas
showed that the dominant approach to the dominant servitude had
not lost its teeth. The Twin City Power Company had acquired "fast"
or "riparian" lands on both banks of the "Savannah River" for inclu-
sion in its own Clark Hill project which had its own hydroelectric com-
ponent.47 The issue was stated to be one of valuation, but that was in
reality a fig leaf for the antecedent question of the nature of the un-
derlying property rights. Twin City Power Company had acquired
these fast lands because they offered an ideal site for the construction
of a dam to meet the growing power demands of the river area, and
the market price for the lands in question reflected the value of such a
use. But the utilization of the flow within the river was precarious
given the dominant nature of the navigation servitude. Justice Doug-
las took evident delight in pulling the rug out from under the com-
pany's plans by holding that the government did not have to
compensate the company for the value of the site as a power station,
no matter what its own planned use of the land. Under the circum-
stances of the case, Twin Cities could claim Congressional double-
cross, for in the period from 1901 to 1919, Congress six times had au-
thorized it to build the dam in question.48 There is a certain charm in
allowing the government to acquire this land for the value of its stand-
ing timber only to use it to construct its own dam project. A similar
double-cross had been thwarted in Monongahela Navigation v. United
States,49 where the private right to charge tolls was treated as a com-
pensable element of damages. But the navigation servitude in Chan-
dler-Dunbar swept this precedent aside.
45. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Power Co. 229 U.S. 53 (1912). For what it is worth
this decision took place during the Lochner period.
46. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
47. 1& at 223.
48. Id. at 231. (Burton, J., dissenting).
49. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
[Vol. 31:643
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Justice Burton, for the four dissenters, insisted that the appropri-
ate measure of compensation was fair market value of the property in
question, measured by what a third party would pay for the assembled
site. But the mistake that Burton makes is that this buyer would be
quite happy to pay something for the expectation that the government
would not pull the rug on the deal. If, however, the navigation ease-
ment is paramount, then the buyer would be subject to the same level
of political risk as the seller, and therefore would only pay that re-
duced sum of money that reflected the risk of the loss, without com-
pensation, of the navigation easement. The government need not pay
for that expectation when it lies in its own power to dash it. So if the
regrettable law on navigation servitudes is correct, then Twin City is
correct also. And it is one in a line of cases - the Taylor Act grazing
rights are the post-Warren Court example5 ° - in which the govern-
ment's use of its at-will powers has reduced its compensation bill, but
left the aspirations of private parties in tatters. The proper cure,
though, is not to dispute Douglas' treatment of at-will rights, but to
dispute any view that the commerce power has authorized the crea-
tion of the paramount navigation servitude in the federal government.
The ability of the government to squeeze the last drop of advan-
tage out of its practical rights was also the theme in General Box v.
United States,5 another water rights case involving timber on "bat-
ture," a Louisiana institution which gives the state the right to cut
down timber that grows on private lands located between the high and
low water marks. Since early times, state law has given the state the
power to remove this timber, without paying compensation to riparian
owners, in order to maintain navigation along the river. As part of the
federal program for flood control along the Mississippi River, the
state agreed to assign, without cost, its right in batture to the Federal
Government for its part in the project. The United States went in
under this servitude, without notice, destroyed the timber, and then
was successful in defeating a claim for compensation for the value lost.
As assignee of the rights of the state, it had to pay no more compensa-
tion than the state did. The question of whether these batture rights
were assignable was not discussed in the opinion, and Justice Reed
reached the unhappy conclusion that the state's own easement was
one that allowed for the bulldozing of the timber without giving the
owner the opportunity to harvest it for commercial use.
50. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
51. 351 U.S. 159 (1956).
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Once again one is struck by the massive inefficiency in the nature
of this operation. If the similar easement of batture had been given to
a private party, notice and opportunity to harvest would have reduced
the costs of the total operation, since the gains that the government
gets from not giving notice (especially when there is no emergency)
are small relative to the value of the timber needlessly lost. One could
also argue that servitudes of this sort should not be freely assignable
- as most riparian rights are not assignable, because of the danger
that the assignee will impose far heavier burdens on the servient ten-
ant than would the original owner. But all these points were brushed
aside, and the long tradition of construction of easements and con-
tracts in aid of government power carried the day. General Box did
not establish a power of Congressional dominance. But it certainly
helped to preserve it.
The third of the Warren Court water cases is in a sense the most
difficult to understand. In United States v. Virginia Electric 2 the gov-
ernment acquired an interest in some riparian lands by condemnation.
Those lands were subject to a flowage easement that the owner had
conveyed to the respondent prior to the initiation of the condemna-
tion, and the landowner quite happily agreed to convey to the govern-
ment a second flowage easement over that same land for $1.00, but
"subject to 'such water, flowage, riparian and other rights, if any,' as
the respondent owned in the tract."53 It followed therefore that the
government did not have to compensate the riparian owner for the
value of the land while flooded, since the owner had ceded that right
to a third party. The question is whether it had to compensate the
respondent for its loss of the assigned flowage easement (that is, the
flow of navigable waters) when the government could keep those wa-
ters to itself by exercising the navigation servitude, thus reducing to
zero the value of the discrete flowage easement to its purchaser.
If one looks at the two private interests separately, there is a cer-
tain logic to the government's case, but this truly looks like a situation
in which the sum of the parts should be as great as the whole. If com-
pensation is denied the respondent, then the party that profits from
the initial purchase of the flowage easement is not the respondent as
purchaser, but the government. The original landowner gets full com-
pensation in two parts, but compensation for one part is paid by a
52. 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
53. Id at 625.
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private party; yet the benefit of that compensation goes into the gov-
ernment pocket. This approach hardly encourages security of ex-
change, for useful transactions between private parties will not take
place if the sum of the values created is necessarily less than the values
that existed before the transaction. It will hardly do to promote a sale
of an easement if the total value of compensable interests before sale
is $1,000, but after the sale of part the total value of the compensable
interests is reduced to $500. Why enter into any deal that grants a
windfall to a stranger? Yet that is one unfortunate development that
can occur whenever the government acts like a sleeping giant, armed
with the navigation servitude club.
The Supreme Court held that the flowage easement was entitled
to some value, but on a very odd theory. It was not that the water
itself could be used for power purposes on the riparian lands. Rather
the sole source of the value lay in the threat that it gave the holder of
the interest over the owner of the land, in its "right to destroy" any
uses that might take on this land, a right so powerful that any buyer of
the land would be well-advised to make sure that the easement was
purchased as well.54 The Court thus held that it was a mistake to treat
the flowage easement as though it were the "equivalent of the value of
the servient lands for agricultural, forestry, or grazing use."'55 The
right measure of value under the circumstances was the ability of the
holder of the interest to block these uses by others. All this is odd if
not perverse: the purpose of eminent domain is to overcome holdout
problems, a point recognized in the negative in Twin City Power,
where the claim for value expressly excluded any holdout value. And
it makes it utterly unintelligible as to why the holder of the servient
land would create the easement in the first place, for the development
rights in the land are worth far less split than they are together.
Professor Michelman finds in this case the idea that condemna-
tion is sensible for the outright destruction of a thing, but not for a
partial regulation of the thing which leaves the owner with some
residual element of value.5 6 The problem here is that of the numera-
tor and denominator: does it make a difference if the state takes all of
a small thing, or part of a large thing? It is one that has embarrassed
the Court in the years since Virginia Electric.57 It might be nice to
54. Id. at 630.
55. Id. at 633.
56. Michelman, supra note 39, at 1232-33.
57. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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afford compensation (albeit by the wrong valuation method) because
the interest is separate and apart from all others and thus fully wiped
out, but it is in my view social folly to have to decide constantly
whether a parcel of land which is developed by subdivision over time
may be regulated within an inch of its life without compensation.
The overarching theme should be that no division or combination
of interests in land should add or detract from the government's obli-
gation to compensate. Private parties should not have an incentive to
reconfigure their land to maximize the compensation payable. "Com-
pensation neutrality" should become a mantra of this branch of the
law much as "tax neutrality" is a mantra of a sound system of taxation.
Justice Stewart, writing in Virginia Electric, hinted at just this ap-
proach when he noted that "[t]he guiding principle of just compensa-
tion is reimbursement to the owner for the property interest taken.
'He is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his
property had not been taken. He must be made whole but is not enti-
tled to more.' '5 8 Just the juxtaposition of these two sentences shows
how little Justice Stewart approached the critical questions. Compen-
sation for the property taken does not include consequential damages;
yet these must be included if the property owner is "to be put in as
good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken."
And any effort to carry this approach over to regulatory takings would
lead to a revolution in outcomes, for no longer could the question be
whether any viable economic use was retained, but whether that use
was equal in value to the property prior to regulation - a rule that
makes most zoning restrictions compensable events. But Justice Stew-
art had no inclination to go beyond the particulars to the larger the-
ory. He thus missed another opportunity to write a far more
searching examination of the takings law, and the decision itself is but
a small ripple in the general torrent of cases that allow the navigation
easement to remain far more dominant than it deserves to be.
2. Overflight Easements
The difficulties that water rights present in the overall scheme of
property rights are paralleled in part by overflight rights. Long before
the Warren Court, courts and legislatures were forced generally to
make peace with the airplane's massive challenge to the ad coelum
rule, under which, in an incautious moment, the common law gave the
58. Virginia Electric, 365 U.S. at 633 (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934)).
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surface owner the rights over lands to the heavens, secure in the fact
that these rights were of value to no one else. The airplane changed
that, and these rights were reduced in size and stature (over eminent
domain challenges) to protection of the area of effective occupation,
so that a classical holdout problem did not bring air transportation to
a halt. The air traffic was regarded as an upper neighbor to the land-
owner. The question of trespass in the lower airspace remained, and,
in the pre-Warren Court decision in United States v. Causby,59 it was
held that airplanes that engage in low overflight have taken a compen-
sable easement in the property for which compensation is required -
hardly a threat to the welfare state.
In Causby, the only party that flew over the lands was the United
States, so it was easy to figure out where to point the finger on the
question of compensation: by the rules of vicarious liability, the honor
fell to the government. With Griggs v. Allegheny County,60 the over-
flights were by commercial carriers, so that the simple agency model
created an incredible problem of apportionment of the harm, with the
further embarrassment that the taking of the overflight easement was
by a private party. Not to worry. The Court held that the local gov-
ernment that agreed to operate the airport had to pay for the ease-
ment it had, de facto, condemned. In essence, the local government
was treated as though it stood in the shoes of the United States. Jus-
tice Black dissented, saying that the plaintiffs had targeted the wrong
defendant, a constant problem in eminent domain cases, for he be-
lieved that the federal government that underwrote the program, not
the state airport authority, had condemned the easement.61 The point
here is one of little long-term institutional significance, for once the
issue is flagged by the courts, any dollars and cents financial issues
could be decided by contract between the federal government that
supplies funds to local airports and the airports that receive those
funds.
Griggs therefore does little harm, and for that matter, little good.
Its moral is that where there is no navigation servitude (in the skies)
the compensation model is alive and well. The difficulties surely come
with the valuation of the interest in quiet enjoyment that is compro-
mised by the development. The sad point here is that when the nui-
sance is caused not by an overflight, but by a flight over adjacent
59. 328 U.s. 256 (1946).
60. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
61. Id. at 90-91 (Black, J., dissenting).
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properties, that interest becomes noncompensable, at least by one im-
portant Circuit Court opinion.6' The whole problem would have been
decided far more sensibly if it were understood that nuisance-like ac-
tivities by the government are compensable wrongs, just as nuisance-
like activities by private parties can be suppressed without compensa-
tion. Thus, the Warren Court had the chance to bring some parity to
public takings law and private nuisance law, but, once again, it missed
the opportunity.
3. Lien Rights
In one sense, the most important case decided during the Warren
Court years was an obscure dispute over lien rights to unfinished
boats. In Armstrong v. United States,6 3 a shipbuilder in default was
forced by the United States to transfer all its interest in the boat and
the materials on hand to the United States, free and clear of all
mechanic's liens on the boat - including that held by Armstrong. No
one doubted that the government could call for the unencumbered
boat, but it is quite a different question as to whether that option,
when exercised, could nullify all state law mechanic's liens. In one
sense they could, because the government could take free and clear
title to the boats, so the lienors specific security is lost. But in the
relevant sense they could not. The Court held that the Federal Gov-
ernment could take free and clear title only by paying off the liens.
Since that option is always open to private parties as well (for the
nature of a lien right is for security only), the government in essence
was told that it had to respect the existing liens, for which it promptly
paid. This result was, in the long-run, a victory for the government,
for if the rule had remained otherwise, no one would dare do work
without prompt payment on a government vessel. The risk of high-
handed government action would lead to more inefficient construction
practices that could only increase the government's costs of military
procurement. In a sense therefore, Armstrong is the flip side of Gen-
eral Box.64 The government as assignee takes subject to liens that
bind the assignor.
One may doubt that there is one law professor in a hundred who
knows Armstrong for its facts. Rather, the case has entered the legal
canon solely for one concluding observation, which has become the
62. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
63. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
64. 351 U.S. 159 (1956).
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bible for all those who wish to limit the scope of government regula-
tion generally (myself included). Its sacred text reads, "The Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 65
The sentence is a bolt from the blue which follows an observation
that the ability to keep the boat lien-free under its contract with the
shipbuilder offers no reason for not compensating the lien holders.
Yet in principle the sentence could apply to any form of regulation
that imposes heavy burdens on a single individual for the benefit of
society at large. Seen in this light, the Eminent Domain Clause is
designed to deal with matters of public funding and to counteract the
dangers of majority rule. This notion was belittled in the post-Warren
Court decision of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York,66 which held that fairness and justice did not apply to mere reg-
ulation that prevented the development of valuable land. Intuitive
ideas of fairness and justice, though, cannot be so easily expunged
from takings jurisprudence. They were appealed to, for example, in a
dissent by Justice Scalia, who insisted that if San Jose wants to have
rent control for the benefit of poor people, it could tax generally and
provide specific subsidies. 67 San Jose had no warrant in forcing the
costs on the hapless landlords whose units were occupied by indigent
tenants.
The efficiency implications of Justice Black's justice claim are also
evident. If the state has to pay, it will compare the private costs of
development with the state gains, for it has to persuade reluctant tax-
payers to foot the bill. But allow these burdens to be imposed on a
small minority within the jurisdiction, and we have the constitutional-
ization of Leo Durocher's famous maxim, "let's you and him fight."
But of the possible extension of this insight to zoning or rent control
65. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
66. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The profanation of the sacred text reads as follows:
While this Court has recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [is]
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), this Court, quite simply, has been unable to
develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
Id. at 123-24. The citation is to Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) a Warren
Court decision, discussed infra text accompanying notes 94-100.
67. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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- both held clearly constitutional then and now - there was not so
much as a glimmer or hint. Another constitutional opportunity
missed, by a judge who actually cared about the larger issues lurking
in the case.68
B. General Regulations
1. Prohibition on Use
What is most striking about the Warren Court is that it faced very
few cases in which general regulations, short of dispossession, limited
the use and development of property. The first case of this sort was
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,69 where the government
imposed restrictions that prevented mine owners, as owners of nones-
sential wartime operations, from operating their mines. In these cases
the government took nothing, in the sense that it did not seize the
mines but only stopped their full economic use, in order to serve the
public good in wartime. In order to minimize the scope of the govern-
ment intrusion, the Court gave this hypothetical: if the order had re-
stricted the use of all equipment needed to operate the mine, there
would be no taking; why then complain about the exercise of a larger
right that imposes no greater burden?70 The fallacy in this argument
is that it assumes that any ban on equipment use is not a taking of the
equipment, with a consequential loss measured by the lost profits
from the mine. But that restriction on equipment use appears to con-
stitute a taking as well, for which consequential damages are appropri-
ate. A private party could be held for lost profits whether he barred
the mine doors or stole the tools. Why should the government be in a
different position? The verbal parry to one side, the hard question is
whether this regulation is a taking, and if so whether that taking is one
justified by the exigencies and necessities of war.
At one level this was a straight regulatory takings case, and the
decisive precedent is Mugler v. Kansas,71 where the prohibition on li-
quor manufacture was thought to be less offensive insofar as the gov-
ernment did not take possession of a factory that became a worthless
hulk (and potential liability?) for its owner. It came as no surprise
68. See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 518 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting), dis-
cussed infra at pages 662-64.
69. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
70. Id. at 166 ("Obviously, if the use of equipment were prohibited, the mines would close
and it did not make that order a 'taking' merely because the order was, in form, a direction to
close down the mines.").
71. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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that this decision was dutifully cited as a precedent for the outcome in
Central Eureka, as was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon72 whose "too
far" test was cited as working on behalf of the government.
Yet the case involves more than a simple taking, for the decision
was heavily influenced by an attitude of judicial deference to legisla-
tive action in time of war. The decision in Central Eureka is a text-
book example of how dangerous it is to collapse the questions of
takings and justifications into a single undifferentiated mass. If the
restriction on use and operations had been treated as a taking, then
the government would clearly have to pay to effectuate it. The occu-
pation of land for war purposes, even on a temporary basis, resulted in
endless lawsuits to calculate the value of taken leasehold interests, a
line of cases that had run its course prior to the Warren Court. Those
were all actions that triggered obligations for just compensation, and
the result here should be the same. But here, the Court adopted quite
a different standard because a "mere" regulation was involved. "War,
particularly in modem times, demands the strict regulation of nearly
all resources. It makes demands which otherwise would be insuffera-
ble. But wartime economic restrictions, temporary in character, are
insignificant when compared to the widespread uncompensated loss of
life and freedom of action which war traditionally demands."73
There is no awareness that this quotation flies in the teeth of the
sentiment expressed some three years later in Armstrong, and indeed
Justice Black was on the wrong side in Central Eureka. Here, for ex-
ample, the mineowner would surely have no complaint if the govern-
ment bid up the cost of its mining inputs, even if it were forced to
suspend operations to go out of business altogether. So the question
here is not whether there is any special solicitude for established en-
terprises in time of war, for there is none against competition. But the
question does arise, more generally, how should the nation respond to
the vicissitudes of war. War places a premium on the efficient use of
resources, and it is far from clear that this is done through a command
and control economy. Surely, if the only question is obtaining suffi-
cient revenues for funding the war effort, those can be obtained by the
appropriately high level of taxation. Yet no matter what the tax level,
the major fear still remains: the government will not use its tax dollars
wisely if it does not have to pay for the substantial dislocation that it
forces on this hapless coal miner. But far from facing this problem
72. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
73. Central Eureka, 357 U.S. at 168.
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head on, the Court turned somersaults to avoid the compensation
issue.
Oddly enough it is not clear that this case would be decided the
same way today, for even this regulation might flunk the "too far" test
because the restrictions allowed no viable use of the property, at least
for the duration of the war. But again one can never be sure about
the legal outcome under current law: with a temporary restriction, as
this one surely was, some residual economic value was left for future
periods, so it is difficult to know what the reference point should be
for deciding whether the rights were fully stripped or not. Temporary
occupations of property are surely takings; so why not temporary re-
strictions on use? In my view, these cases are all part of a seamless
web, in which small differences in the magnitude of burdens reflect
themselves in small differences in valuation. But the Supreme Court
sees, or constructs, a chasm were none exists. Central Eureka is thus
another wrong decision, and another lost opportunity.
2. Contract Regulation
The interaction between government regulations and economic
liberties is often contested not under the Takings Clause but under the
Contracts Clause, and in the Warren Court there was one notable
opinion that upheld the right of the state to modify the protection it
afforded purchasers of property at foreclosure sales. In City of El
Paso v. Simmons,74 Texas had long allowed the owners of foreclosed
property the indefinite right to redeem so long as their redemption
rights were not cut off by a sale to a bona fide third party. The effect
of this unwise provision was that it made it impossible for title to be
quieted so long as property remained in the hands of the state. In this
case, land was sold in 1910 under a contract that called for a down
payment of 2 and 1/2 percent, with interest due annually on the full
amount. The principal on the loan was never paid down. Some thirty-
one years after the initial transaction, in 1941, Texas changed the rules
of the game so that the right of the defaulting buyer to redeem the
property was cut off in five years, whether or not the property was
sold. Six years after the passage of this statute, the buyer went into
default, and one day after the five year limitation period had expired,
the purchaser sought to redeem his land. That redemption was per-
missible under the terms of the original contract, but was precluded by
74. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
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the 1941 statutory modification. The Supreme Court,75 over the lone
dissent of Justice Black,76 upheld the statute on the ground that the
state had great latitude in the manipulation of contractual obligations,
at least since its critical decision in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell.77
All things considered, even a die-hard defender of contract rights
has to put in a kind word for the 1941 statutory reforms, which go a
long way toward clearing title to lands in the Texas system. Yet this is
not to say that the result reached by the Court was correct, for the
proper solution is to provide just compensation for the elimination of
the original contract rights, a provision to which even Blaisdell paid lip
service. But what kind of compensation should be paid? In Blaisdell
the state's argument was that the tenants in possession continued to
have to make mortgage payments to the lender for remaining on the
property - albeit payments that did not leave the lender indifferent
to the loss of his foreclosure rights.
In this case, that compensation theme could have been pursued if
the state made a small forgiveness in the total outstanding amount of
the loan. But how much? The answer has to be very little indeed.
The 1941 statute applied only prospectively, and it allowed any de-
faulting buyer five years to set matters right from the date of any fu-
ture breach, a pretty generous forgiveness period. The mortgages
carried very low interest rates and the property had appreciated in
value, so that the risk of default was quite low. Hence it is quite possi-
ble that a one percent downward adjustment in the principal balance
would have improved the situation all around, without the need to
enter into time consuming negotiation with each purchaser of state
lands. The strength of Justice Black's position thus rests on a point
that he did not quite make: the ease with which this adjustment can
be made, and the importance of making that adjustment for the fidel-
ity of our constitutional tradition. The Court's eagerness to improve
the machinery of conveyance, "to restore confidence in the stability
and integrity of land titles,"78 and to avoid the "perpetual reinstate-
ment"79 of defaulting, led it to read Blaisdell as a decision that said
75. Id. at 517. Compare West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (up-
holding the power to condemn a bridge that the government had conveyed to a private owner
upon just compensation) with Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
76. Simmons, 379 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
77. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
78. Simmons, 379 U.S. at 511.
79. Id. at 513.
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that contract rights may be ignored when there is a compelling state
interest to do so, a position that is productive of all sorts of mischief
when applied generally. That conclusion may well on rare occasions
be correct when the public gains from the sacrifice of contract (or
property) rights is huge and the possibility of making compensation to
the individual losers of the transaction is small. But here an easy
mechanism exists, and perhaps it would have been wise to have held
Texas's feet to the fire to make sure that they observed the constitu-
tional niceties, not because the 1941 statute was foolish and unwise,
but because all its laudable objectives could, and should, have been
achieved through payment of just compensation, in the form of a
downward debt adjustment.
Once the hard cases go the wrong way, then it is quite easy to
allow the state to repudiate obligations - in the public interest, of
course - when one percent adjustments in mortgage balances are not
quite sufficient to carry the day, as happened with the regrettable
Supreme Court decisions that allowed the federal government to re-
nege retroactively and with impunity on its promises to firms that
joined in its Pension Guaranty Corporation.80
3. Rate of Return Regulation
The question of regulation has also arisen in connection with
cases dealing with rate of return regulation. The rate of return formu-
las were first introduced into the law in order to avoid two horns of a
dilemma in dealing with those industries that could be fairly described
as natural monopolies, that is, those industries characterized by dimin-
ishing marginal costs of production over broad portions of their sup-
ply curve. The diminishing marginal returns implies that it is more
costly for two firms to produce the relevant outcome than one, and
hence a cost to competition. The price of judicial and legislative indif-
ference to this prospect is monopoly profits to the producer. The
price of excessive legislative regulation, however, is the risk of confis-
cation of the facilities of the producer, who can be allowed a return
sufficient to cover the variable costs of his investment, but not to re-
cover the capital invested within the firm.81 The "just compensation"
solution is one that allows the state to regulate but insists that it allows
80. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
81. For a discussion of these and kindred difficulties, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,
488 U.S. 299 (1989).
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the regulated firm to recover a risk-adjusted rate of return on its in-
vested capital. The key question is how.
Before the Warren Court, Justice Douglas, in one of his most in-
fluential decisions, Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas,'
held that it was sufficient for the government to give each firm that
suitable return on its initial investment without having to determine
whether the capital invested was still used in the rate base. The ques-
tion in the Permian Basin cases 3 was whether the investments of sep-
arate and distinct companies in a common pool of oil and gas had to
have their rates of return under Hope Natural Gas calculated on an
individual basis, or whether each firm could be required to accept a
return based on their pooled investment. "The most fundamental of
these [constitutional questions] is whether the Commission may, con-
sistently with the Constitution and the Natural Gas Act, regulate pro-
ducers' interstate sales by the prescription of maximum area rates,
rather than by proceedings conducted on an individual producer ba-
sis."' The pooling procedure created substantial administrative sim-
plification, and it did not increase the total costs to consumers above
and beyond what they would have to pay under Hope Natural Gas.
But it had the further effect of enriching some members of the pool at
the expense of the others. Justice Harlan wrote for eight members of
the Court in sustaining the restriction, quoting Hope and noting that it
applied here. The decision simply followed the general rule that enor-
mous discretion is allowed the government in administrative proceed-
ings, especially on matters of rate regulation which had been
"customary since time immemorial" 5 in common law jurisdictions.
Once again we have the Supreme Court on cruise control, without the
slightest effort to examine whether the justifications for price regula-
tions in other settings might be exceeded in this particular context,
given the equally ancient requirement of a reasonable rate of return
on investment. The vast bulk of the opinion was then dutifully de-
voted to complex administrative law and rate regulation matters.
In something of an irony, Justice Douglas thought that his Hope
Natural Gas rule still had some teeth, and dissented on the ground
that his decision a quarter of a century before required the level of
82. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). That decision rejected the earlier view that the rate of return was
calculated only on those assets used and usable in the business. See also Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466 (1898).
83. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
84. Id. at 768.
85. Id., citing, as one might expect, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 (1876).
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individualized determinations that afforded each party its own just
rate of return.86 But owing to the Court's general lack of interest in
the constitutional issues, his complaint went largely ignored: but once
again the question is why when the issues are so profound and diffi-
cult. Could the state condemn a city block of houses and pay each
owner the average value of all houses on the block? Or would some
individuation be required? The answer is not easy to reach and de-
pends at the least on the interaction of the costs of an individual eval-
uation relative to the anticipated deviation from the true value that is
produced by adopting any short cut. But that relationship was just not
probed in a setting that thought that judicial deference to administra-
tive decisions was the proper response in all complex regulatory set-
tings. Yet the problem is more insistent, and it comes back to haunt us
all under the Cable Act of 1992, another price regulation scheme
where the costs of individuation are too high, and the dangers of mis-
evaluation too great. But massive impracticality offers no constitu-
tional defense under the Takings Clause, although it should.
4. Civil Rights Cases
The stakes in the next regulatory takings case of this period are
somewhat higher. Most people remember the constitutional battles
over civil rights statutes and think of the question of jurisdiction. Is
this statute constitutional because it falls under the commerce clause
or because it falls under the equal protection clause? Yet there was
also a takings issue raised in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,8 7
which was dispatched with commendable swiftness by the Court.
Once it was decided that the activities in question affected commerce,
then the only issue was this: "If it [the statute] had such a basis,
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and
appropriate. If they are, appellant has no 'right' to select its guests as
it sees fit, free from government regulation."88 Lots of states passed
these laws, lots of people thought that they were correct; and the fact
that there is an obvious tension between the basic right to exclude and
the requirements of the civil rights laws was dismissed by putting the
word "right" in quotation marks, as if the scare quotes performed the
analysis.
86. Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 829 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
87. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
88. Id. at 258.
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In truth the challenge is far more serious. At one level the argu-
ment is that so long as the government does not occupy the land itself,
then it is all right to breach the wall of exclusivity. But this means that
property ceases to be a way to organize relations between individuals
and instead only works as a bulwark against direct government intru-
sion. The thought that the government has a strong stake in the out-
come, given the private constituencies that line up behind or against
legislation, was not really addressed in this case. Instead the Court
noted that there really was no loss in this case:
It is doubtful if in the long run appellant will suffer economic loss as
a result of the Act. Experience is to the contrary where discrimina-
tion is completely obliterated as to all accommodations. But
whether this be true or not is of no consequence since this Court has
specifically held that the fact that a 'member of the class which is
regulated may suffer economic losses not shared by others... has
never been a barrier' to such legislation.8 9
The impulse is manifestly inconsistent with Armstrong, which had
been decided only four years before. The question of compensation is
a real one, of course, and the possibility that a universal imposition of
the prohibition would regulate all such institutions cannot be dis-
missed out of hand. By the same token, one would hope for more
argument about the question. Thus one possible approach asks
whether the antidiscrimination norm should apply to firms in competi-
tive industries, where new entry is feasible, or whether it should be
confined to monopolistic situations, including protected trade unions,
and common carriers and inns that enjoyed a position of that sort in
earlier times. Here it could well be that these conditions were no
longer satisfied, and the statute could still have been justified as a
means to counter the private violence that would have stopped most
restaurants from integrating when they wanted to. But no contingent
empirical claims were raised in this case. Generalized truths (whose
truth is far from self-evident) coupled with statements about irrele-
vance ruled the day.
For this Court the social issue dominated the narrow legal one.
In the light of hindsight one would hope that some people at least
would think that a far tighter justification for this restriction on prop-
erty use is called for. But if so, then we once more have a case of a
missed opportunity to strike down a statute that has been extended
well beyond its permissible limits under both the commerce and the
89. Md at 260.
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takings part of the analysis.90 But for takings law there was no inno-
vation here. And for the Court to innovate on takings in the context
of civil rights would have been too suicidal for its political survival.
The powerful New Deal conception that property does not include the
right to pick one's trading partners was a status quo position that this
Court was eager to embrace.
In one sense the challenges to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 broke
no constitutional ground, for "all" the Warren Court did was to ratify
legislative judgments about the constitutionality of the statute. Its
level of judicial innovation, however, became far more pronounced in
Reitman v. Mulkey9' where in an ironic sense the tables were turned.
In that case, California had passed a statute, the Unruh Act, which
prohibited discrimination in private real estate markets, both sale and
rental. The statute itself was overturned by a referendum which in
effect provided that all private owners had the right to sell or lease
their property to whomever they pleased - a restoration of the prior
common law position that treats the right to dispose of property to
whomever one sees fit as an ordinary property right. The referendum,
which was carefully drafted, did not apply to hotels and other forms of
public accommodations to which a traditional common carrier duty of
universal service attached. And it was not selective in its application:
whites and blacks alike each had the same right or power. There is
little question that even the Warren Court would have done nothing if
the original common law rule had neither been disturbed by legisla-
tion nor reinstated by referendum. But once the status quo ante was
brought about by referendum, then the judicial wheels started to turn.
The passage of the statute was clearly motivated to preserve the rights
of private individuals to discriminate. From there it was thought to be
a short leap to saying that the discrimination was "authorized" by the
state, which had returned the power of selection to the individual.
From there it was a short move to say that a race-blind statute was
itself in direct violation of the Equal Protection Clause, whereupon it
was struck down.
What is quite remarkable about the case, is that the common law
definition of property rights did not suffice to defend a statute against
constitutional attack. Thus, once the obvious is established - that
real estate rental and sales markets are highly competitive - then the
90. For this constitutional challenge, see RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS ch. 7 (1992).
91. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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bottom drops out in any case that allows a restriction on the right to
choose trading partners. If so, then the proper constitutional fire
should be directed not at the referendum that repealed the Unruh
Act, but at the Act itself. Yet so strong was the Warren Court's com-
mitment on discrimination that it was prepared to strike down the re-
instatement of the common law position even though it would not
dare in and of itself to hold that some antidiscrimination law in hous-
ing was constitutionally required. Any conflict between property
rights and the modem civil rights movement could come out only in
one way.92
Ill. POLICE POWER JUSTIFICATIONS
The second of the great eminent domain questions concerns the
scope and limits of the police power justification. On this issue the
major bone of contention - before, during, and after the Warren
Court - has concerned the extent to which the law of nuisance shapes
the contours of public law. I have long argued that it does and
should, and that the government as agent of successful citizens cannot
go beyond their powers, save to condemn upon just compensation.93
If the boundary lines between neighbors make sense under the law of
nuisance, then the government cannot simply inject itself on one side
of a private dispute and change the rules of the game. So, in the end,
the position here is relatively simple. Where the private party com-
mits the nuisance, then a government injunction, tailored to the situa-
tion, can be imposed without paying compensation. Where it has
committed no nuisance, there is no wrong to enjoin, and the govern-
ment must purchase any easement that it desires. There is no right for
an individual to pollute; but no right for the government to stop by
fiat activities that are short of pollution. In some cases the govern-
ment stops one nuisance, or tolerates another, but provides compensa-
tion under the parallel restrictions imposed on others. These
situations raise the question of implicit-in-kind compensation that was
not much in evidence during the Warren Court. Here, two police
power cases, which are striking not for their differences in outcomes,
but for their differences in language and approach, will be discussed.
92. I use the phrase "modem civil rights." That commitment was also found in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), which read the 1866 Civil Rights Act to bar private
discrimination in housing.
93. Eps-nr, supra note 22, chs. 8-9.
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In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,94 the question before the
Court was whether Hempstead was within its rights to stop the appel-
lant from removing all sand and gravel from its mines, an activity that
it had undertaken continuously for nearly thirty years. In the first
year of the digging, a large crater was made, which was filled with
water and thus transformed into a twenty acre lake with an average
depth of twenty-five feet. The question was whether this restriction
on the right to remove sand and gravel was so onerous and unreasona-
ble as to constitute a compensable taking.
The first question, of course, is whether any restriction on the
right to mine on one's own land constitutes a prima facie taking by the
government. On that issue, the ad inferos companion to the ad
coelum rule indicates that mining sand and gravel is an ordinary inci-
dent to property, and one that can be severed and sold as a separate
interest. The entire question then is whether the restriction on digging
below the water level is necessary to protect from collapse of the
homes and structures located in the vicinity. For these purposes the
assumption will be that the common law recognizes a right of lateral
support, so that if that showing could be made, then the restriction is
permissible, unless some lesser restriction yields the same benefit.
(The discussion will ignore the question of margins: what happens if a
fifty percent relaxation in the restriction increases the chance of sub-
sistence by one percent?)
The Court duly noted that this prohibition wiped out all the eco-
nomic value from the land but did not think that this itself was suffi-
cient to condemn the ordinance, for Mugler and Central Eureka were
available as precedents and were duly pressed into service for the pro-
positions for which they so obviously stand.95 And once again we
were assured: "There is no set formula to determine where regulation
ends and taking begins."'9 6 But this basic orientation was strengthened
by the "usual presumption of constitutionality" which upheld the re-
striction as a valid police regulation.97
What is most fascinating about the case was the way in which the
Court peered into this question. The opinion starts with some prom-
ise, when it says that a safety regulation should be evaluated in light of
its impact on safety. "To evaluate its reasonableness we therefore
94. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
95. Id at 593-94.
96. Id at 594. It was the words "set formula" that were incorporated into Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 428 U.S. 104 (1978).
97. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594-96.
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need to know such things as the nature of the menace against which it
will protect, the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic pro-
tective steps, and the loss which the appellants will suffer from the
imposition of the ordinance."98 The Court then notes that there was a
"dearth of relevant evidence" on these points, which might lead the
uninitiated to think that the state has not carried its burden to show
that the regulation is related to safety. But the lack of relevant evi-
dence was turned into a decisive advantage for the state: "Although
one could imagine that preventing the further deepening of a pond
already 25 feet deep would have a de minimis effect on public safety,
we cannot say that such a conclusion is compelled by facts of which we
can take notice." 99 The bottom line is a heavy burden of proof on
individual owners - "for all we know, the ordinance may have a de
minimis effect on appellants" 100 - whose productive business has just
been wiped out. The question of ends and means is articulated on the
one hand and demolished in application on the other, and the destruc-
tive effect of this cavalier opinion on the nature of local politics is a
large theme, one that cannot be canvassed here. But if Euclid'°1 set
the basic presumption, the Court surely accepted and perhaps ex-
panded it in this case to manifestly unacceptable length. It is as
though there was no abuse in local politics that might be sensibly sub-
ject to a constitutional counterweight. Whatever one might think of
the right of exit as a Tiebout limitation'012 on local government, that
sand and gravel could not migrate to the next township to escape the
effects of local politics. The expandability of the police power was an
important theme, and Goldblatt gave the law a solid push in the wrong
direction.
The second of the police power cases is much more congenial. In
National Board of Young Men's Christian Associations v. United
States,03 the question was whether the government was responsible
for riot damage inflicted on two YMCA buildings in the Panama Ca-
nal Zone, close to the Panamanian border. The government moved
98. Id. at 595.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 596.
101. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
102. Charles M. iebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL ECON. 416 (1956).
His theory in effect argued that local governments each provide a mix of goods and services (and
the taxes to pay for them) so that the effective constraint against local government abuse is the
right to leave the jurisdiction. That might work for families choosing whether to live in an area
with good or bad schools, but it hardly protects owners of real estate against local exploitation.
103. 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
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troops into the area because of rioting and looting, and when the
troops took shelter from snipers inside the "Y," the buildings were
burned down. The action against the rioters was obviously fruitless,
so the "Y" turned to the United States government on the ground that
the presence of federal army units inside the building spurred the riot-
ers to take greater destructive steps.
This is one case that the government should have won. Ex ante,
it is far from clear that the "Y" would prefer to go without protection,
and far from clear that if it did, its facilities would have escaped de-
struction. So, the theory of causation is directed to the wrong target,
and it is always a bad argument in tort to say that A should be liable
solely because B is not. At one level therefore, the buildings were
destroyed by the enemy, not the government. Moreover, even if the
government were responsible, its actions were done in good faith for
the benefit of the parties harmed, hardly a reason to impose strict lia-
bility on the very party who seeks to help the victims. Indeed the
chief contribution of YMCA to the takings debate is that it shows how
enormous a gulf lies between the justifications that the government
asserts when it is in the right, and the mischievous arguments that it
makes when, as in Goldblatt, and in Euclid before it, it is clearly in the
wrong. It is not that the Courts cannot think of sensible lines of gov-
ernment privilege. It is that they do not think, at least until very re-
cently, that sensible limitations were any part of its supervisory
powers over state and local governments, which always received a
clean bill of health.
IV. PUBLIC USE
The third of our key questions is whether the taking can take
place at all. Obviously this issue will not arise if the government re-
strictions are justified under the police power, for then the public is
protected from the aggression of one of its members. But there are
many cases where the government offers compensation where this is-
sue is of manifest concern. From the time of Calder v. Bull'°4 to the
present, courts have intoned that it is no part of the proper function of
government to take property from A in order to give it to B, even if B
is prepared to pay just compensation for it. Bypassing the market in
these circumstances is a manifest infringement of individual liberty
104. 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386 (1798).
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and an invitation to government abuse, one that undercuts the stabil-
ity of private ownership that lies at the core of sound constitutional
order and a market economy.
The difficulty with this version of the public use test is that few
cases of general importance seem to fall within it. In some cases there
are lots of people in the position of B, so it looks as though there is
some wide scale public purpose or benefit that justifies the imposition.
It becomes somewhat churlish to suggest that if one individual cannot
force A off his land, then a conspiracy of many should not have that
power. Either can buy in the open market. But with the rise of public
housing projects for the poor in the 1930s, this barrier was overrun,
for now land could be taken from private owners and rented out to
particular tenants, in a taking from A, to An, with a transfer to B, to
Bn.1°5 Justice Douglas took the basic argument a step further when, in
Berman v. Parker,0 6 he concluded that the state could take over a
local department store in a blighted neighborhood, even to sell it off
again, as is, to another owner, as part of its neighborhood rehabilita-
tion plan. Underlying his decision was an unqualified deference to
Congress and its judgment about the proper determinants for good
health and for good community living.' °7 Those of us who think that
planning is a disease that is best extirpated believe that this presump-
tion is groundless and the exercise of the power is mischievous. But
the later cases, most notably Poletown08 at the state level and
Midkif0 9 at the federal level, have upheld schemes that have allowed
the simple transfer of ownership, in one case for the benefit of Gen-
eral Motors and the destruction of an entire neighborhood, and in the
other when all that changed was who owned the property.
As indicated, these results are indefensible and invite the disrup-
tion of a social fabric which falls under the heading (both before and
during the Warren years) as noncompensable good will.110 One rea-
son to insist on a strong reading of the public use limitation is that the
just compensation laws are so rigged as to provide landowners little
105. See, e.g., In Re New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
106. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
107. ld. at 32.
108. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
109. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
110. For my position, see Richard A. Epstein, Rights and "Rights Talk," 105 HARV. L. REv.
1106, 1114-17 (1992), reviewing MARY ANNm GLENDON, RiG-rs TALi: Tim IMPOVERISHMENT
OF POLITICAL Discou1sE (1991).
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protection against the government bulldozer."' Assessor and legal
fees, good will, nontransferable goods, are not taken by the govern-
ment even if they are costs incurred or benefits destroyed by govern-
ment action. Loss of amenities and neighborhood are treated in the
same mechanical fashion. The limitation on public use might be ac-
ceptable if the just compensation backstop were firmly in place, but in
the absence of robust rules on compensation, there is an open invita-
tion to land grab policies for the rich and influential that the public
use language was designed to deter. Once again, the encomium to
planning that fell from Justice Douglas' pen reads odd today. One
wonders what happened to the blighted area that was targeted for re-
newal and improvement. It seems all too likely that communities
have been savaged by the government that is called upon to protect
them. Here is one instance where a stronger protection of property
rights goes hand-in-hand with a stronger protection of community.
Berman aside, there was little that needed to be done or could be
done on the public use frontier. The only other case that addresses
this question is a deservedly obscure case called Dugan v. Rank,112
which held that if the government diverts water from a private holder
for public purposes, the taking cannot be enjoined in District Court,
but rather by an action under the Ticker Act, which today has to be
brought in the Federal Circuit. This jurisdictional two-step is much
more onerous than is usually supposed. Sometimes it is far from clear
whether the injunction should be sought in District Court, because
compensation has not been tendered, or whether damages should be
sought in the Federal Circuit. In Preseault v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n,"3 for example, the Supreme Court on its own motion dis-
missed the plaintiff's cause of action for want of jurisdiction on the
ground that the Rails-to-Trails Act did not prevent individual holders
of reversionary interests from seeking compensation under the Tucker
Act against the United States." 4 The Court's unfortunate decision
meant that the landowner's petition to regain possession of his prop-
erty was misguided, and that action had to shift to the federal circuit
for compensation. The division of business between the District
111. See Gideon Kanner, When Is 'Property' Not 'Property Itself: A Critical Examination of
the Bases of Denial of Compensation for the Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL W. L.
REv. 57 (1969).
112. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
113. 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
114. The National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (Amendments), Pub. L. No. 98-
11, 97 Stat. 48 (1985) (codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994)).
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Court and the Federal Circuit contemplated by Dugan is tolerable (if
unwise) so long as the government makes it clear that it is committed
to the taking. But when the legal situation is murky, the present juris-
dictional rules create an unnecessary divide between two different
courts, which invites a huge constitutional shell game that should be
condemned even by those who think well of vesting the government
with major planning powers.
V. COMPENSATION
The last part of the analysis concerns the nature of the compensa-
tion that is offered for a taking. Sometimes it is cash and in other
cases it is in kind. A full analysis of this question is one that requires a
close look at the distribution of benefits and burdens of regulations. It
is an analysis which looks with presumptive suspicion on selective re-
strictions on some property owners and presumptive approval on stat-
utes that impose uniform restrictions on the same group that receives
a set of uniform benefits. I think that sorting out these relationships is
one of the major tasks of a sensible set of constitutional norms of the
just compensation issue, but there is little if anything in the Warren
Court oeuvre that addresses this question, so the analysis again is fo-
cused on decisions before and after it sat.
VI. CONCLUSION
It should be clear that I am the odd man out from this celebration
of the Warren Court. Its work on property was generally perfunctory,
occasionally mischievous and only rarely informative. But lest anyone
think that this means I am a strong critic of the Warren Court, I hope
that the effort would show that my own positions are decidedly more
complex. I am generally supportive of the Miranda developments, 115
and of reapportionment. I have no hidden qualms about Brown v.
Board of Education.116 While I think that New York Times v. Sulli-
van"17 ventured too far from the safe portals of common law defama-
tion, on its facts the decision was clearly correct, no matter how much
I disagree with the Times' editorials on property rights, health care or
affirmative action. Indeed any effort to impose sensible judicial limi-
tations on representative government will have a respectful hearing
115. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
116. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?
53 U. CHi. L. REv. 782 (1986).
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from me, for mine is not a conservative critique of the position of the
Court, but one that accepts its anti-majoritarian orientation and
wishes that it extended to cover other areas as well. I do not see any
opposition between liberty and property but regard them, as the Due
Process Clause has them, as linked in a single yoke. My quarrel with
the Warren Court is that it fell asleep at a constitutional switch, when
it should have been more aware of the major contribution that the
strong protection of property rights has for the overall constitutional
order.
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